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1. Introduction 
Finite and uncertain supply motivates managers and policy-makers to seek efficient and 
effective water uses. Increasing technical efficiency in the extraction, delivery and 
consumption of water may increase its  economic, social and/or environmental welfare-
enhancing outcomes but, paradoxically, higher water-use efficiency (WUE) can also result in 
increased total extraction/consumption of water resources (Loch and Adamson 2015). By 
increasing total water demand, WUE thus creates positive feedback loops placing greater 
pressure on water supplies. In this article, we seek to examine WUE capital exposure to 
future water supply uncertainty through the economic lens of decision-makers. 
Our study is motivated by expectations that increased total water demand and 
uncertain future water supply can amplify private capital investment risk exposure that, when 
scaled, may result in large irreversible losses. Following Grant and Quiggin (2005), risky 
events are confined to cases where objective probabilities can be assigned to help explore the 
outcomes from decision-making. Where events and their consequences cannot be 
characterized by well-defined subjective probabilities, uncertainty tests the decision-maker s 
capacity to respond and adapt. Uncertainty thus increases capital exposure to finite water 
supply. Investments under uncertainty therefore pose challenges for decision-makers. 
Ordinarily we might assess an investment choice over time using cost–benefit analysis 
(CBA). However, there is considerable debate surrounding how best to incorporate and/or 
represent risk and uncertainty in a standard CBA. The approach taken in this article is to 
understand capital risk exposure at multiple scales by combining CBA with a state contingent 
analysis (SCA), which we believe offers considerable analytical clarity with respect to 
understanding capital investment decision-making under uncertainty. This approach to 
understanding capital risk exposure is consistent with guidelines developed by the IPCC 
(1994) which specify that evaluations of water management projects (e.g. WUE projects) and 
their impact should examine the inherent uncertainty of future outcomes including 
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reductions in irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources and perform sensitivity 
analysis of the estimated benefits and costs (Frederick 1997). 
Uncertain climate change impacts on water supply are likely to be particularly 
important for decisions involving long-lived investments, owing to difficulties in identifying 
benefits and costs, irreversibilities, and real-option choices (ibid.). This applies to places such 
as California where future access to surface and groundwater supply is being reduced by an 
uncertain degree (Hanak et al. 2019). The use of state-contingent analysis would enable us to 
model uncertain state outcomes that, coupled with an improved understanding of decision-
makers  adaptation to realized water supply, enhances our appreciation of: i) why WUE 
investments may fail to attract private capital investments at a significant scale, ii) how 
subsidies may incentivize greater WUE adoption, but increase investment risk-exposure 
across multiple scales, iii) the riskiness of large-scale transitions toward high-value perennial 
crops, and iv) likely future requirements to modify existing risk-sharing arrangements 
between water managers and users dependent on social or private benefit objectives in the 
local context. 
2. Risk, Uncertainty and Cost–Benefit Analysis 
Well-constructed cost–benefit analysis (CBA) can help explore different trade-offs from 
allocating factors of production (land, labour and capital) between alternative investment 
options. In this case, the quantification of future cash flows (expenditure and income) over 
the life of an investment in alternative WUE options related to almond production, and 
discounting them back to a net present value, allows for comparisons between alternative 
capital investment choices (including real-options). 
Ordinarily, the net present value (NPV) is the sum of the expected net return from the 
investment 𝐸 𝐼  over the project duration in years 0 …  𝑛 , divided by a discount rate r 
(Equation [1]). The result provides a key metric for evaluation in the form of 𝐸 𝐼 𝑌
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𝐾 , where Y is the net annual return derived from the investment and 𝐾 is the capital 
invested. Further, 𝑌 𝑐  where revenue  is a multiplication of the output  and 
price paid per unit of output 𝑝  so that 𝑝 and costs 𝑐  account for both fixed and 
variable expenditures. 
𝑁𝑃𝑉  ∑    [1] 
If 𝑁𝑃𝑉 0, then the project has broken even. When 𝑁𝑃𝑉 0 the project is profitable. 
Finally, when 𝑁𝑃𝑉 0, the project is expected to make a loss. However, consistent with the 
IPCC guidelines it is logical to assume that both risk and uncertainty occur when estimating 
the final generated output, prices paid/received, and WUE investment costs. Thus, 
representing and quantifying the negative and positive impacts derived from risk and/or 
uncertainty estimates on any single WUE investment is crucial to understanding the 
opportunity costs of a full set of investment choices. 
The risk and uncertainty debate surrounding CBA estimations of investment choices 
takes three major forms. First, what is the appropriate discount rate to reflect the values 
associated with uncertainty: a precautionary principal, or the intra- and/or inter-generational 
benefits from realigning society towards alternative outcomes (Dietz and Stern 2008)? 
Second, what is the appropriate way to represent risk and uncertainty to quantify the costs 
and benefits used in the analysis? Third, it has been argued that the very nature of CBA 
prevents the uncertainty problem from being reflected , as these events either fundamentally 
change the nature of the scenarios used to describe outcomes, or result in realized outcomes 
(e.g. output or prices) that have never been previously experienced (Horowitz and Lange 
2014). In what follows, we ignore the first debate issue and focus our analysis on a decision-
makers  private investment choices over a fixed time-period (i.e. 25 years). Next, we address 
the second and third debate issues via an initial discussion of the limitation of mean-variance 
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representation of outcomes, and then illustrate the power of combining state-contingent 
analysis to dealing with uncertainty within a slightly modified CBA framework. 
Risk and Uncertainty within a Traditional CBA Framework 
Within a CBA framework, risk/uncertainty is typically included via sensitivity analysis to 
explore mean and variance of a probability distribution of variables which 
positively/negatively impact costs/benefits (Merrifield 1997). We can illustrate this using a 
Just–Pope production function (Equation [2]) that explores output from the use of a single 
input (e.g. water): 
𝑔 ℎ   [2] 
The Just–Pope production function describes both additive risk 𝑔  where any reliance on 
additional inputs increases exposure uniformly, and multiplicative risk ℎ  where decisions 
to use additional inputs to risk-increasing/decreasing effect will be dependent on the decision-
makers  relative risk aversion function. In this case, the error term  is frequently based on 
past data, where the known mean and variance parameterize a probability distribution 
function in a Monte Carlo simulation. This allows for a series of outcome-runs to determine 
the likelihood of an investment covering the accumulated debts associated with its selection. 
However, Just and Pope (1978, 1979) challenged the use of mean-variance 
approaches to stylize risk and/or uncertainty in their reviews of stochastic production 
functions. Prior to this, Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970, 1971) also noted several limitations of 
relying on mean-variance by illustrating the outcomes (i.e. identification of a riskier variable) 
from choosing between variables that had the same expected value, but different mean 
distributions. One critical limitation, commonly known as Mean Preserving Spread, 
identifies the failure to understand how alternative weights in the distribution of tails can 
result in investors choosing riskier rather than safer investments. While the notion of 
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representing risk and/or uncertainty as a deviation around a mean number is appealing within 
partial equilibrium analysis, which is common in CBA due to scope constraints, this approach 
assumes that the decision-maker remains passive to the signals provided by the source of risk 
and/or uncertainty. In other words, the analysis may depict the investor (e.g. farmer) as one 
who refuses to adapt in the face of required change, no matter the uncertainty signal. For 
example, in the case of irrigated cropping such models may represent any refusal to adapt as 
continuing with the same irrigated crop even when no water inputs are available. Thus, the 
nature of risk-increasing/decreasing inputs of production are typically concerned with 
variability and how that alters the net return on asset(s). However, what is less considered is 
the situation where capital investment occurs with respect to an input which is the source of 
uncertainty (e.g. water with highly uncertain supply characteristics, which may drive infinite 
prices, or make the technological selection worthless on average in the short-run). If we are to 
incorporate an assessment of that type into our CBA investment evaluation to fit the IPCC 
guidelines, then we must utilize a modelling approach capable of dealing with uncertainty. 
For that, we turn to state-contingent analysis models. 
State-Contingent Models of Uncertainty 
With respect to the analysis of information and uncertainty Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) 
define two branches of study: market uncertainty and technological (event) uncertainty. In 
this case we are interested in event uncertainty and how that relates to future water input 
states and their impact on investment choices. Assessment frameworks capable of dealing 
with uncertainty and long-term investment decisions (e.g. WUE capital) also broadly fall into 
two branches: models where the probabilities of future states are unknown by the decision-
maker although possible states are recognized, and models where decision-makers are aware 
of both the states and their relevant occurrence probabilities can be derived from available 
data (Götze, Northcott, and Schuster 2008). State contingent analysis (SCA) models of 
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uncertainty are capable of following both these broad approaches. This informs our choice to 
couple SCA models to our CBA capital investment assessment to operationalize IPCC 
recommendations on risk assessment. 
Early studies used the term states of nature  when discussing the assessment of 
investment choices under exogenous risk and uncertainty. The earliest work was undertaken 
by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959), providing a capacity to represent how decision-makers 
respond to realized alternative states (e.g. drought/flood events). Graham (1981) used this 
approach to explore farmers  willingness to pay for a public dam project that provided water 
supply in dry states of nature, and flood mitigation in wet states. However, it was 
Hirshleifer s (1965, 1966)i work that articulated differences between the dominant mean-
variance approach and the state of nature representations of risk or uncertainty to inform 
investment choices. According to Hirshleifer (1965), the state of nature approach removed 
the vagueness  (pg. 534) associated with other uncertainty methodologies, as it allowed the 
decision-maker to precisely identify both the natural endowments provided in a given state, 
and the factors of production required to obtain an output in that state. This finding has been 
reiterated in more recent studies (e.g. Hildebrandt and Knoke 2011). 
R. G. Chambers and Quiggin (2000a) subsequently extended the state of nature 
approach by merging it with dual optimisation to illustrate how resource allocations represent 
optimizing input use in all states, by time, place and typeii (Rasmussen 2003). Following this 
work, the state of nature approach became the state-contingent analysis (SCA) approach. In 
the SCA approach, nature  defines the state space that can be divided into a series of 
states of nature  to define real and mutually-exclusive sets (S) describing uncertainty 
1, 2, … , , … , 𝑆 . Importantly the decision-maker has no ability to influence which  
occurs; s is determined exogenously. Further, the decision-maker s subjective belief about the 
frequency  of each  occurring is a probability vector described by , … , . 
However, for each  the decision-maker does have a set of management options giving rise to 
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alternative production possibilities (technology set). This can be represented (Equation [3]) 
by a continuous input correspondence, : → , which maps state-contingent inputs 
into output sets that are capable of producing that state-contingent output vector  (R. G. 
Chambers and Quiggin 2002b, pg. 514): 
z  ∈  : x can produce z   [3] 
Consistent with the CBA assessment objectives stated above, for each  the vector of inputs 
𝐱 , . . , , their endogenous prices 𝐰 , . . , , and output prices 𝑝 , . . , 𝑝  
are state dependent (R. Chambers and Quiggin 2000b), so that revenue can be represented as: 
  ∀ ∈ , [4] 
while costs can be represented as: 
  ∀ ∈ , [5] 
and expected net profit across nature Ω is: 
𝐸 𝐼   ∑  𝐜∈    ∀ ∈ . [6] 
Under the above conditions where inputs, input prices and output prices are fully known, and 
where the decision-maker s management responses to alternative  does not alter, the total 
nature set Ω can be collapsed. Therefore, once  is realized, there should be no vagueness in 
how decision-makers should respond. In such cases, not only is the risk and uncertainty 
completely described but the decision-maker could then actively respond to that risk and 
uncertainty by reallocating inputs, where possible, via a wider set of management options. 
Critically for our assessment, this combination of completely describing uncertainty 
and the contingent outcomes limits the positive/negative impact of uncertainty. We can 
express this another way. When parameterising risk and uncertainty any future water supply 
outcome can only be either greater than, or less than, the chosen parameter. For example, in 
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the case where uncertainty over the total supply of water (i.e. quantity of water) is the source 
of risk, the outcome can only result in more or less water than was expected. However, the 
severity of the realized water supply outcome may encourage the adoption of superior 
technologies (e.g. WUE capital) as a proactive response. Consequently, sensitivity analysis 
could play a role in informing the thresholds at which a given technology would fail, and 
encourage the discovery of newer technology alternatives. At those failure points, if new 
technologies emerge over time, then a new set of  may be required expanding the original 
total nature set  as our understanding of those s changes. Concurrently, the new s set may be 
represented by a new probability distribution  to reflect the decision-maker s 
understanding of their s choices. 
Importantly from the previous discussion, Equation [6] slots seamlessly into Equation 
[1], allowing for the coupled CBA-SCA framework as recommended by J. Hirshleifer (1966) 
and Graham (1981). In this article we thus posit three hypotheses: H1 that current constraints 
on the inclusion of uncertainty in CBA assessments can be addressed by our coupled 
approach; H2 that incorporating risk and uncertainty in CBA assessment enables robust 
modelling of water production inputs and WUE capital impacts and a better understanding of 
private/public capital investment opportunity costs; and H3 that assessments of WUE 
investment using a coupled CBA-SCA approach can achieve a better understanding of water 
as a production input and capital-vulnerability to shocks, suggesting potential change to 
future risk-sharing arrangements. Before we test these hypotheses, the next section details the 
value of water inputs in production systems, and the riskiness of capital investments in water-
use efficiency. 
3. Water Resources in a Production System 
Recall the Just–Pope production function (Equation [2]) which specifies output as a function 
of inputs (e.g. water). Water inputs in the Just–Pope production function include both 
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additive and multiplicative risk. R. G. Chambers and Quiggin (2002a) respecify the Just–
Pope production function into an SCA format  𝑔 , , highlighting how 
stochastic information can be represented to explain adaptive responses to revealed states of 
nature and their outcomes. Using SCA, Mallawaarachchi et al. (2017) provide a two-stage 
technology example for dairy sector adaptation to drought. We rewrite their Equation [6] into 
a single technology set described as , , where all variability derives from the 
natural resource base (e.g. soil fertility) , and the multiplicative risk derived from a vector 
of inputs (including water) to explain dairy farmer adaptation during drought. Also thinking 
about drought adaptation, Adamson et al. (2017) explore the behavioural responses of 
different irrigator types (perennial and annual) to protect capital investments. By developing 
a two-period SCA game against nature where irrigators bet against receiving their water 
entitlement (i.e. input uncertainty) the authors explain how and why water prices transition 
from inelastic, unitary elasticity, through to elastic in response to water supply uncertainty. 
They achieved this by separating water into two distinct input types: i) water used to generate 
output , and ii) water used to maintain perennial production systems (i.e. keep them alive)
although they did not specify this mathematically. However, if we merge the concepts from 
Mallawaarachchi et al. (2017) and Adamson et al. (2017) we can re-represent the SCA 
production function as: 
 , , .  [7] 
The equation now represents how  is produced in each , on a given area of land, using a 
combination of additive risk from natural soil fertility  and two multiplicative risk signals 
for water inputs : that is, those inputs required to keep the production system alive 𝑔 , 
and water inputs required to generate outputs ℎ .iii Note, 𝑔 0 for all annual crops. The 
addition of an error term for 𝑔 beyond Chambers and Quiggin s original equation is 
deliberate to account for the decision-makers  unawareness of inputs required in each state. 
LE-97-3-10-Loch 
6F, 0T, 2A 
This separation of water into 𝑔 (maintenance water) and ℎ (productive water) illustrates that 
an inability to meet 𝑔  units of water results in irreversible losses of capital directly 
invested in that production system (e.g. rootstock, trellising, and some irrigation equipment). 
Separation also illustrates the opportunity (real-option) costs of bringing forward perennial 
production system replanting investments. Adamson et al. (2017) argued that to avoid 
irreversible losses perennial producers may be willing to pay a risk premium on the price for 
water that leads to short run financial losses if, on average (in the long-run), the investment at 
least breaks-even. However, investors may face the prospect of no future access to water
although annual producers may provide access via markets (where available) as they do not 
require 𝑔 water between years. This highlights the differences between annual production 
systems that require water in the relevant state outcome (risk decreasing short arrows 
Figure A1a, Appendix A), and perennial production systems that require water across all 
states of nature (risk increasing long arrow Figure A1b, Appendix A). For simplicity, 𝑔 is 
always required as an input for perennial production systems. 
As discussed, a common policy approach to reduce the risk associated with water capital 
investments is WUE. While debate about the value of WUE continues among scientists, 
water managers and policy-makers, a less-discussed issue is whether or not WUE actually 
provides greater capital investment protection in the face of rising future risk and uncertainty. 
Therefore, before detailing the model and results, we first carefully define the terminology 
used in our investment assessment in the sub-section below. 
Water-Use Efficiency as a Risk-Reducing Strategy 
Broadly, WUE focuses on technological innovations that enhance the targeted output in the 
use of water resources. Engineering innovations may reduce losses in water delivery systems. 
Agronomic innovations may increase outputs per unit of water applied, say by reducing weed 
competition. Economic innovations may maximize returns per unit of water applied. Perry 
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(2007) defines different discipline terminologies as: field application efficiency (engineering) 
which is the ratio of crop irrigation water requirements and water delivered to a field; 
irrigation efficiency (agronomic) which is the ratio between water consumed by crops and 
water diverted; and water-use productivity (economic) which is the true dollar value of output 
produced including the opportunity cost per unit of water applied. Alternatively, we could 
consider a water-use index (WUI), which is the crop output (z) per unit of water diverted 
(Barrett Purcell & Associates 1999). 
However, these alternative terminologies can lead to confusion and debate in the economics 
of water-use deliberations. We suggest, similar to Lankford (2012) that, unlike many 
treatments in the literature, WUE assessments should focus on understanding how total water 
delivered to the farm gate is utilized. In this context, system inefficiencies inside the farm 
gate are within the farmers  ability to manipulate through capital investments or management 
strategies. Everything beyond the farm gate is outside the farmers  control. Thus, to 
maximize the net economic returns from innovative WUE investment or strategic decisions 
we must account for the full cost of all water diverted at the farm gate where the decision-
maker will only invest in those options that deliver financial profitability under full resource 
cost. We therefore focus on water-use productivity (or economic WUE) regardless of 
investment option as our assessment basis, and specify it as 𝐸 𝐼 𝑀𝐿⁄ ; which is the total 
expected income 𝐸 𝐼  generated from all diverted water at the farm gate 𝑀𝐿, or more simply 
the net profit made from all water use activities. Next, alternative WUE investment options 
can also be redefined using the common denominator 𝑀𝐿: 
x Field application efficiency redefined as 𝑀𝐿 𝑀𝐿⁄ : or the 
quantity of water required to provide sufficient input to irrigate 
a production system (ML′) from diverted water 𝑀𝐿; 
LE-97-3-10-Loch 
6F, 0T, 2A 
x Irrigation efficiency defined as 𝑀𝐿∗ 𝑀𝐿⁄ : or the water 
consumed by crops (ML*) from diverted water 𝑀𝐿; and 
x Water Use Index (WUI) defined as ( 𝑀𝐿⁄ : or the output 
produced  from diverted water 𝑀𝐿, 
 where 𝑀𝐿 𝑀𝐿 𝑀𝐿∗ 𝑊𝑈𝐼. 
This allows us to examine how farmers may: reallocate water resources to maximize 
profits by understanding the opportunity costs of investments in WUE, determine if water is 
the binding constraint, and/or identify alternative (better) investment choices. 
Consequently, we can simplify WUE investment choice sets into three groups (Figure 
1, adapted from Skagerboe 1983). First, farm design choices 𝑚 𝑀𝐿 𝑀𝐿 : this 
explores the costs and benefits of alternative infrastructure systems to store/deliver water 
around the farm (e.g. channels from the farm gate, on-farm dams, and pipelines to/from 
paddocks). Second, application technology choices 𝑎 𝑀𝐿 𝑀𝐿∗ ; these are the 
capital/practice options used to irrigate paddocks (e.g. flood, drip, sprinkler irrigation). Third, 
SCA production system choices , , , which account for capital invested in 
more g 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or h 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  water-efficient commodities that may require less 
maintenance/productive inputs to generate similar outputs. Using this approach, we can now 
explore the risk to alternative investment and/or management strategy decisions associated 
with farm design, application technology, and SCA production system choices. Most 
importantly from a risk and uncertainty perspective, we are better able to represent and 
explore WUE investment and strategic management decision outcomes allowing for the 
prospect that water inputs may not be available at all times. 
When water inputs are not available we reveal the fragility of our four alternative 
investment choices. First, there is negligible risk exposure to 𝑀𝐿  farm design choices if 
water is not available. Some ongoing maintenance and refurbishment may be required, but 
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there will be no irreversible capital loss. Conversely, when water is not available the capital 
risk exposure for 𝑀𝐿∗ application technology and/or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  𝑜  𝑐 𝑜𝑝  production system 
investment choices is context specific. For example, under a drip irrigation system if 
sufficient g water is not available and the rootstock dies, replanting will also require 
replacement of the drip system. However, for flood-irrigated h water annual crops the risk 
exposure to application technology and production system capital choices may be minimal in 
the absence of water inputs. We account for this differential risk exposure and total water 
input requirements via Equation [8]: 
,  , ,  𝐦   [8] 
In the new specification, output accounts for , 𝑚, 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  that includes not only 
natural land endowments, but also how application technology choice 𝑎  change both 
𝑔 and ℎ water input requirements dependent of crop choices. The water input losses from 
producing commodity outputs by application technology and delivery infrastructure 𝑚  are 
also included. The combination of application technology and management practice choices 
influence both return flows and non-recoverable losses (Lankford 2012). 
Consequently, we can now explore: the returns to capital invested in 
𝑚, 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝 ; the gains from increased WUE from changing the composition of 𝑔 
and/or ℎ water input requirements by commodity, and the possible gains from upgrading 
farm design. Having now specified all of the precursors to the model, in the next section we 
describe the potential capital risk exposure from changing states of nature which include 
outcomes where water is both reduced in supply, and not available at all. We also describe 
the investment scenarios, the dataset/assumptions used, and then analyse investment choice 
outcomes using our combined CBA-SCA approach. 
4. Scenarios & Data 
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The applied example is based on developing an almond production system in California s 
San Joaquin Valley which is predominantly supplied with groundwater resources. The 
decision-maker s choice problem is how to allocate a capital budget between five alternative 
production systems: the base case and four variations corresponding to investing in 
𝑚, 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝 . Each of these investments has different water-use characteristics. To 
explore any vulnerability in these investment choices to supply shocks, two alternative 
climate settings are explored: current and new. Finally, two subsidy settings (no subsidy and 
50% public subsidy) are used to better understand the incentives required for private 
investments in WUE. This provides a total of 18 scenarios, where the base case for current 
and new climate is not explored using the subsidy setting. All scenarios are listed in Table B1 
(Appendix B) note that the scenarios do not include outcomes from upgrading a mix of 
investment options, or a portfolio involving all investment options. Current climate water 
supply uncertainty 1, 2, 3  is represented by three  (normal, dry and wet) with a 
frequency 0.5, 0.2, and 0.3 respectively. Under a new climate regime, these frequencies 
change to 0.25, 0.75, and 0 respectively based on projections from the IPCC (2018). This new 
climate setting is harsh, and there is no wet state of nature, but the volume of water available 
in each  does not alter. 
All values are in US$. In Table B1 under the Base case, the cost of 𝑚 is estimated at 
$94,000, and in each  typical water losses are estimated at 10%, 15% and 10% of total water 
applied. For example, using Year 1 data presented in Table B3 (Appendix B), total water 
losses 𝑚 𝑔 ℎ 𝑎 10% 12.36 0 3.09 1.55 𝑎𝑐 𝑖𝑛 . To achieve a 25% water 
saving in 𝑚, an alternative farm design will increase base case 𝑚 costs by 50%. The water 
losses by 𝑚 thus reduce to 10% 75% 12.36 0 3.09 1.16/𝑎𝑐 𝑖𝑛. Alternatively, a 
decision-maker could invest in standard field application technology 𝑎 at a cost of 
$1,620/acre, or select high-quality technology to achieve 25% water savings at a multiplier of 
1.5/acre. Finally, it costs approximately $8,070/acre to establish the almond crop (irrigation, 
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crop variety etc.). However, if the decision-maker was to invest in 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  varieties 
(respectively) by spending an additional 25% to gain the desired varietal attributes, then the 
respective 𝑔 𝑜  ℎ water requirements would fall by 10% per annum. 
For all scenarios, it is assumed that the decision-maker owns 105 acres of land, of 
which 100 acres can be used for production, and the residual area is non-productive 
accounting for the homestead, sheds, and the water delivery system 𝑚 . The state-contingent 
production costs and outputs, costs of in-field technology choices 𝑎 , crop variety 
establishment costs 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝 , and the cost of borrowing capital are derived from 
Yaghmour et al. (2016). The 𝑚 costs were obtained from 
https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/landscape/drill-a-well/ (data accessed 12 November 
2018). Data has deliberately not been adjusted for inflation for two reasons: i) to improve the 
transparency of how the data has been used and modified, and ii) this study is not designed to 
provide financial advice, but rather explore water use-efficiency concepts. 
However, where Yaghmour et al. (2016) use a 23-year period to estimate the annual 
repayment of establishment costs, this study uses a 25-year period such that the costs fall 
from $581/acre to $558/acre. The full costs of 𝑚 are summarized in Table B2 (Appendix B). 
The cost of borrowing capital is 4.75% and it is assumed that the decision-maker borrows 
100% of the capital required, and repays this investment back annually over a period of 25 
years. Consequently, the annual repayment cost/acre of establishing an almond crop is then 
$735/acre (m + a + crop = $735 = $65 + $112 + $558). The investment period and repayment 
plan has been deliberately chosen to be identical to the productive life of an almond 
production system as it provides the opportunity to explore the residual debt if the crop dies 
in a given year, given by Equation [9]. 
𝑅𝑒 𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 ∑    [9] 
where 𝑙 is the year of investment failure. 
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Nature and State-Contingent Production Systems 
Like many areas of California, the water supply for this farm is derived from groundwater 
resources. Poorly metered and relatively low-cost access to groundwater resources makes 
them particularly vulnerable to over extraction, which have resulted in planned caps on total 
system extraction and/or systematic access reduction (Leahy 2015) to address overdraft 
(Howitt et al. 2014). Drought and climate change increase the time required to replenish these 
resources (Famiglietti 2014), exacerbating overdraft rates. In response, well-depth increases 
as does pumping costs. Thus, it has been assumed that the true availability of water, and its 
access costs, will change in response to state of nature (Scanlon et al. 2012). Groundwater 
resources in the southern San Joaquin Valley are particularly vulnerable both in terms of 
constrained recharge and subsidence (Faunt et al. 2016). As a consequence of the 2007–2010 
drought, approximately 2% of California s aquifer storage has been irreversibly lost (Ojha et 
al. 2018). 
Thus, in our model while on-farm water supply is regulated by the use of a reservoir 
(Table B2), groundwater cost and availability changes by . In the normal (N) state, 
groundwater availability is 74 acre-in at a cost of $22/acre-in; which generates 3000 lb/acre 
of almond meat. In the dry (D) state, groundwater restrictions reduce availability to 51 acre-in 
at a cost of $26/acre-in; but only 2000 lb/acre of almond meat is produced. In the wet state 
(W), access to groundwater is unrestricted, allowing producer to pump up to 82 acre-in at a 
cost of $21/acre-in, and the almond crop yields 3900 lb/acreiv. The full description of how 
groundwater is used in each  by the vector of required inputs appears in Table B3. All data 
for the division of water by 𝑚, 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  are approximate. However, the sum of 
𝑎, 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  for all years is based on Yaghmour et al. s (2016) estimation of the total 
water applied per acre. The data for 𝑚 appears in Table B1, and as such the total groundwater 
expenditure differs from that of Yaghmour et al. For clarity, in a normal/wet year the sum of 
losses by 𝑚 and 𝑎 account for 27% of total water use per acre (e.g. in Year 1 for a normal 
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state of nature (3.09+1.55)/17= 27%). In a dry year, losses increase to 30% due to higher 
evapotranspiration rates, etc. 
Table B4 (Appendix B) provides all other variable and fixed costs of the production 
system. At full maturity, annual variable costs will range between approximately $3,560/acre 
in a dry state, and rise to $4,110/acre in a wet state. The difference in costs is due to 
groundwater use and costs, other operational expenses, and harvest costs. Finally, for 
simplicity the analysis assumes that: dry and wet state almond meat production increases 
proportionally in years 1–5 based on extrapolations of Yaghmour et al. s (2016) data for the 
normal state; full crop maturity and almond production occurs from year six; the decision-
maker is operating within a perfectly competitive market free of externalities or subsidies 
(unless tested); the actions of the decision-maker do not alter prices; and there are no barriers 
preventing industry growth. 
5. Results 
Table B5 (Appendix B) provides the CBA outcomes from the Base scenario using an SCA 
framework to explore the risks from investing in almonds. The total cost of the investment is 
$18,390/acre, and $735/acre is paid off the debt every year for 25 years. The repayment 
includes all expenditure towards farm design, application technology, and the crop variety 
choice. 
Once the almond crop is in full production, annual average benefits are estimated at 
around $2,400/acre. Income benefits range from a $300/acre return in a dry year up to 
$4,100/acre in a wet year. By the end of the 25-year investment, total income of $43,370/acre 
is expected; although if only normal years occur total income generated would fall slightly to 
$39,580/acre. The cash flow (benefits–costs) from the investment are therefore calculated to 
be $25,000/acre, ranging from net losses of –$19,895/acre up to $61,210/acre profit. At a 
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discount rate of 4.75% the NPV is $9,234/acre, the benefit-cost ratio is $1.87, and IRR is 
13%. 
The CBA results therefore reflect a typical minimum, maximum, and expected 
outcome analysis. However, it is the additional model representation of how the decision-
maker responds to the revealed states that adds clarity on opportunity costs. If the CBA had 
focused on an annual (i.e. non-g water) production system the decision-maker could alter 
crop selections, reduce total area planted, and/or cease planting/irrigation entirely in response 
to water supply uncertainty. Perennial (i.e. g and h-water) production systems do not enjoy 
such flexibility in their decision options. For perennial systems, net returns rapidly reduce 
when the state-contingent event frequency changes. Table B6 (Appendix B) summarizes the 
scenario results from changed climate outcomes, and differences between unsubsidized and 
subsidized (i.e. 50% funding assistance toward farm design, establishment and variety 
selection costs) production systems. In both new climate scenarios, all investment choices fail 
to generate positive returns. 
Recall though that the current climate returns are not per acre-per annum; they are 
total over the life of the project. Therefore, while positive, they are not significant. This is 
reflected in Figure 2 by the NPV differential compared to the Base scenario, which is slightly 
positive for investments in 𝑎 and 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  at approximately $100/acre over the 25 years, but 
negative for all other options. Investments in 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  differ here because, while the 
variety selection costs are similar, the water savings in dry events for 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  are higher. This 
illustrates why decision-makers may be relatively unwilling to invest privately in WUE 
options, even where the risk posed by uncertain water supply to inflexible production systems 
is clear. A question therefore becomes whether the motivation to invest privately changes if 
there is some form of financial support available from external sources (e.g. government or 
NGO funding providers)? We test a scenario where 50% of the total farm design, 
establishment and variety selection costs are subsidized, and recalculate the CBA outcomes. 
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In this case, all NPV differentials compared to the Base are positive across all investment 
choices, and crop variety options provide the highest saving/benefit returns (Figure 3). This 
highlights the relevance of subsidy support to private investment choices, reflecting reality in 
many water contexts. 
However, 25 years is a long period, over which we should expect to see some shift in 
climate conditions. Our new climate scenario tests what effects any water supply shock (e.g. 
capping, systematic access reduction and/or drought) may have on investment outcomes, with 
respect to the unsubsidized/subsidized scenarios. The new climate settings shift the 
probability of drought occurrences to 0.75, which is extreme but comparable with expected 
outcomes reported by IPCC under business as usual arrangements resulting in 1.5° to 2.0° 
warming (IPCC 2018). Under these conditions, we assume that the probability of Wet states 
also falls to zero. For farms that enjoy no subsidy support only investments in 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  
technology will result in slightly positive returns; all other options result in neutral or highly 
negative NPV returns compared to the Base (Figure 4). 
Where 50% investment subsidies are available, the NPV returns compared to the Base 
becomes positive for all of the investment options, with 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  𝑜  𝑐 𝑜𝑝  investments 
becoming initially sound (Figure 5). However, it is critical to return to Table B6 above, and 
note that total NPV returns over the life of the project are negative in all new climate 
scenarios. 
An alternative way to illustrate the negative effects of extreme climate change from 
Table B6 above is to chart the cumulative cash flows in each of the 25 years of the project 
required to cover outstanding debt on 𝑎 investments and crop variety choices. This reflects 
the number of years until a break-even point on the project is reached, repayments are fully 
covered, and the project begins to make profits. In this analysis, 𝑚 investments are excluded 
as the farm design is not adversely affected if the crop is irreversibly lost; although this 
investment option is retained in the analysis for completeness purposes. Figure 6 shows the 
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cumulative cash flow results for the subsidized scenario across the current and new climate 
probabilities. In the current climate, subsidized investments in 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  or 𝑐 𝑜𝑝  achieve break-
even in Year 12 all others require approximately three further years to break-even and 
cover costs. However, under the new climate scenario the project never achieves a positive 
return over the project life even when subsidized. 
6. Discussion 
There are only a few examples of water infrastructure investment assessments that 
incorporate uncertainty into CBA in ways that are consistent with the IPCC guidelines. With 
respect to H1, we show that SCA approaches can be used to effectively incorporate 
uncertainty into CBA assessments to provide valuable insight into long-term water-use 
efficiency investment impacts. These impacts are elaborated upon via our other hypotheses. 
With respect to H2, incorporating uncertainty into a CBA assessment with SCA will 
enable detailed modelling of water inputs to production and a better understanding of the 
private/public opportunity costs in capital budget investment. Our analysis provides further 
insight into the private (self) investment viability of WUE technology adoption. Most 
importantly, increased water productivity from investments may not necessarily lead to 
higher input reliability or profitability, as water supply constraints are exogenously 
determined by the states of nature. Typically, investment costs can be high, the savings 
difficult to measure, economic returns may be low, and future water use and supply risk may 
remain unchanged (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez 2008). Additionally, by holding any water-
savings to create a supply buffer against extreme adverse states of nature, decision-makers 
may reduce their risk to capital loss but only at the cost of not freeing up resources for 
alternative uses. Models that fail to reflect alternative states of nature will allocate such 
reserve stocks back into production, whereas that does not occur in reality. Further, in 
LE-97-3-10-Loch 
6F, 0T, 2A 
practice, decision-makers will perceive little benefit from leaving water recovered through 
efficiency improvements in reserve (David Adamson and Loch 2014). 
Our analysis suggests that water-use efficiency investment is only financially 
plausible where the associated commodity returns are high and the supply of water is very 
reliable two factors unlikely to be regularly present in reality. Where private decision-
makers appreciate this fact they may be dissuaded from technological investment, and this is 
reflected in our results. Thus, public support (e.g. subsidies) may be required to incentivize 
technology uptake. However, these incentives may distort price signals for private investors, 
and encourage change at the farm level based on distorted returns to capital investments (as 
shown in our analysis). As subsidies create inefficient welfare transfers, such policies result 
in poor outcomes from an economic perspective. However, where subsidized WUE adoption 
policy is a perceived panacea for scarcity challenges (Gomez et al. 2018), the resultant 
socialisation of risk needs to be considered. As illustrated in our SCA framework, any 
business as usual climate change outcomes may expose private investors, publicly-
encouraged through subsidy incentives, to increased vulnerability . Associated technological 
transformations to high-value perennial cropping systems would also make private investors 
more water-dependent and risk-taking under severe future water supply shocks (Expósito and 
Berbel 2017). Equally, private investors could be exposed to irreversible capital losses and 
higher long-term volatility in income. In such events, the public as the insurer of last-resort, 
could likely be held responsible on the basis of their encouragement to adopt the 
technological change, and as such could be burdened with liability for compensation (David 
Adamson and Loch 2018). 
Any consideration of public subsidies for WUE investments must therefore assess the 
investment viability from both the private (e.g. profit, income, and/or productivity) and public 
investment perspectives (e.g. return flows, food security, poverty reduction, and/or resource 
reallocation) before committing to any co-investment. For example, if we examine this from 
LE-97-3-10-Loch 
6F, 0T, 2A 
the single-user perspective, rather than the wider industry or sectoral view, we may miss 
important ramifications of industry-wide transformations (or societal expectations) under 
subsidy arrangements. This changes the risk-profile and lowers the user(s)  switching cost of 
non-action such that WUE can be perceived as the more flexible  option (Jack Hirshleifer 
and Riley 1979). These incentives also alter perceptions about the reliability of water supply 
by state of nature and any second-round effects resulting from industry-wide transformations 
(Rothenberg and Smith 1971), lowering incentives to seek additional information on 
investment options and impacts. Instead, private decision-makers should investigate risk-
sharing and/or mitigation measures capable of offsetting some/all of the potential shock 
impacts (e.g. land and water planning partnerships with government and/or additional high 
reliability water rights), and incorporate those into their investment assessment and choices. 
Public policy/program designers would also be well-advised to consider the scale of needed 
reforms and the probability of future water supply shocks or other shocks to productions 
systems (e.g. access caps, pest/disease, trade embargoes, political wavering etc.) that could 
negatively affect investment returns before committing to subsidized WUE investments as a 
solution to future scarcity dilemmas requiring reductions of total water consumption (Loch, 
Adamson, and Dumbrell 2020). This advice applies equally to all contexts around the world, 
regardless of their stage of policy and resource-use reform, institutional development, and/or 
rights establishment. 
Finally, the coupled CBA-SCA approach does appear to enable an improved 
understanding of water as a production system input, and its vulnerability to future shocks 
(H3). As stated above, in many cases transformations to higher WUE in production systems 
are often coupled to higher reliance on access to secure water supplies. Yet the main benefit 
that private decision-makers receive from WUE investments is a net reduction in water use 
by . As shown here, long-term investments to achieve water use reductions are risky, 
particularly where the major constraint to productivity and returns is water and actual water 
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reductions remain uncertain based on poor data availability and limited baseline accounting 
(Lankford 2012). In this context, it becomes critical to understand the production system ratio 
of 𝑔  and ℎ  water input requirements to identify and explore the exposure of capital to 
risk in response to changing frequency of states of nature (Loch, Adamson, and Auricht 
2019). Further, policy-makers and water managers should consider changes to the description 
of those states of nature via sensitivity analysis that explore where current WUE 
technology/management systems fail to deliver long-term benefits. 
Study Limitations 
Ultimately this is a farm-based example; we need case studies and data at other scales to 
build basin-scale, regional or even national analysis results. For example, Adamson (2019) is 
exploring the requirements and use of 𝑔 and ℎ water at basin scales for environmental 
benefits. As our assessments scale, unless the net change in water accounts are fully 
understood future investments will be exposed to increased risk if the net demand for 𝑔  
units of water increases. In the real world the size of a payoff from a long-run investment is 
rarely derived from a single risk or uncertainty, but rather a number of alternative futures 
associated with factors that both increase and decrease the rate of return on a given 
investment. Consequently, in this case as the time taken to offset the cumulative debt is 
determined by which state of nature is revealed, and the ordering in which those states of 
nature occur, the repayment timeframe may be significantly altered. As the time required to 
reduce the debt increases, the possibility of some other bad  event (hail, disease 
management, output price collapse etc.) being realized also increases. More work is needed in 
the state-space to articulate and understand the risk-increasing and risk-decreasing nature of 
water inputs to production, which will only come from access to quality data and practical 
applications that assist us to define not only the number of states, but also their descriptions 
in a range of contexts. 
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7. Concluding Comments 
Long run investments in water-use efficiency (WUE) are risky, particularly where water is 
required as a secure input to production systems. State of nature representations of water 
supply outcomes can assist with our increased understanding of the vulnerability of water 
users to adverse events. In this example, we couple a cost–benefit analysis framework to a 
state contingent analysis approach to explore the riskiness of WUE investment payoffs and 
cash-flow outcomes when frequencies of states of nature change over the course of that 
investment. Critically, this approach also allows us to represent decision-maker adaptation in 
the face of risk and uncertainty, and requirements for current discussions related to future 
risk-sharing arrangements. Importantly, dividing WUE investment options into their key 
components at the farm scale in this model adds clarity to the debate surrounding policy 
options to address future water scarcity challenges. It also offers a useful tool for those 
interested in managing climate change impacts on investment more broadly. 
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Figure 1 
Post Farm Gate Investment/Management Choices 
Source: Adapted from Skagerboe 1983. 
Figure 2 
Change in Water Use and NPV Compared to Base (Current Climate/No Subsidy) 
Figure 3 
Change in Water Use and NPV Compared to Base (Current Climate/Subsidy) 
Figure 4 
Change in Water Use and NPV Compared to Base (New Climate/No Subsidy) 
Figure 5 
Change in Water Use and NPV Compared to Base (New Climate/Subsidy) 
Figure 6 
Years for Cumulative Cash Flow to Pay Residual Debt (Both Climates/Subsidised) 
 
i Note Hirshleifer (1965) uses the term state-preference  rather than Arrow s (1953) states of nature. 
ii Refers to three input types: i) non-state-specific (or state-general) inputs that must be allocated ex-ante to the 
 being realized, and which influence  in all ; ii) state-specific inputs that are applied ex-post to the realisation 
of , and which influence  in only that ; and iii) state allocable (flexible) inputs that are applied ex-ante to  
being realized, but where benefits accrue once  is realized. 
iii Plant physiologists discussing crop water consumption may use the terms basal evapotranspiration (ET), or 
the ET that happens before any useful yield, and productive ET which is associated with biomass formation. 
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These two elements are somewhat analogous to our 𝑔 and ℎ; where our 𝑔 represents the water needed to 
maintain a perennial crop for production in following years. 
iv The data for the normal state of nature is from Yaghmour et al. s (2016) Tables B1 to B3, while the data for 
the dry and wet state of nature is defined by Table B5. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Base Invest in m Invest in a
Invest in cropg invest in croph CC-Base
CC-Invest in m CC-Invest in a CC-Invest in cropg
CC-invest in croph
